In a startling and deeply consequential development within the transnational landscape of extremism and geopolitical subversion, the United States-born neo-Nazi paramilitary network known as The Base has openly called for violent operations targeting Ukrainian political, military, and infrastructural nodes. Founded in 2018 by Rinaldo Nazzaro—an American citizen now residing in Saint Petersburg, Russia—and designated as a terrorist organization by multiple governments following a robust FBI counterterrorism campaign that led to a series of arrests, the group has reemerged under dramatically altered circumstances, as chronicled by investigative journalist Ben Makuch. With the withdrawal of FBI scrutiny on far-right domestic threats under the new Trump administration, The Base has pivoted toward international destabilization, aligning its actions with Kremlin strategic objectives in Ukraine.
This development, reported in April 2025 by Makuch, signals the first documented instance of The Base explicitly aligning itself with the geopolitical interests of the Russian Federation. Experts suggest this new posture indicates not only ideological sympathy but likely involvement in Russian-led sabotage, destabilization campaigns, and information warfare currently unfolding across Europe. The Base, operating through a loose and decentralized international network of cells, now seeks to export political violence abroad, filling a niche in Russia’s hybrid war doctrine that exploits extremist militias for asymmetrical objectives.
Rinaldo Nazzaro, also known by the aliases “Norman Spear” and “Roman Wolf,” served with U.S. Special Forces and held a contracting role with the Department of Homeland Security between 2004 and 2006. His transition from U.S. counterterror operations to becoming the head of a transnational neo-Nazi group operating out of Russia has raised persistent suspicions among intelligence professionals and analysts. His sanctuary in Russia, apparent immunity from prosecution, and strategic access to resources—many of them financial, others digital—have led numerous observers, including members of The Base itself, to speculate on his status as either a willing agent or an unwitting tool of Russian intelligence. The precise origin of the funds sustaining The Base remains opaque, though cryptocurrency vectors, anonymous Monero wallets, and unexplained personal wealth have sustained its operations across borders.
Colin Clarke, director of research at the Soufan Center and a widely recognized authority on terrorism and political violence, emphasizes that Moscow’s support of actors like Nazzaro reflects the Kremlin’s willingness to deploy racially and ideologically motivated extremist groups as part of its broader hybrid warfare architecture. Clarke argues that The Base—given its public calls for assassinations and sabotage in Ukraine, coupled with Nazzaro’s residence in Russia and use of Russian platforms—should be viewed not as an independent entity but as part of a network of non-state actors weaponized by Moscow to foment instability across Europe and undermine Western solidarity in the face of Russian aggression.
Utilizing encrypted and semi-open platforms like Telegram, VKontakte, and Mail.ru—each either hosted or protected by the Russian state—The Base has begun soliciting operatives to carry out attacks on Ukrainian soil. Their targets include electric power stations, military and police vehicles, state officials, and government buildings, particularly in major cities like Kyiv, Odesa, and Kharkiv. The group’s messaging emphasizes the strategic vulnerability of Ukrainian authorities during their ongoing ceasefire negotiations with Moscow, portraying this as a critical moment to escalate violence. The messages also promise financial rewards for successful operations, reinforcing the group’s mercenary-adjacent model of paramilitary activism.
A broader ideological project underpins these operational objectives. The Base envisions the creation of a white nationalist enclave in the Zakarpattia region of western Ukraine, citing its mountainous geography as a tactical advantage for unconventional paramilitary operations. This ambition is not new: it resonates with The Base’s foundational doctrine, which stresses the collapse of multicultural societies and the establishment of ethnostates through rural insurgency. Their framing of Zakarpattia as a “force multiplier” draws directly from military lexicons, reflecting Nazzaro’s training and familiarity with counterinsurgency paradigms once deployed by the very state he now subverts.
Accompanying these announcements, the group disseminated nearly fifty propaganda videos in late March and early April 2025 via its Telegram channel. These clips—authenticated by The Guardian through geolocation and metadata analysis—show masked individuals tagging public spaces in Kyiv, Odessa, Mykolaiv, and Kharkiv with The Base’s symbols. In Kharkiv, a city near frontline combat zones and under close watch by Ukrainian security services, the group’s intensified propaganda efforts are particularly conspicuous. One post, captioned “a financial reward for successful action is possible,” accompanies footage from Kharkiv, further illustrating the blend of ideological recruitment and transactional violence that defines The Base’s current strategy.
This campaign aligns with longstanding Russian disinformation narratives designed to delegitimize the government of President Volodymyr Zelenskyy by casting Ukraine as a bastion of neo-Nazi extremism—a grotesque falsehood particularly cynical given Zelenskyy’s Jewish heritage and democratic legitimacy. That the Kremlin offers haven to an actual neo-Nazi leader and his violent network, while simultaneously accusing Ukraine of far-right extremism, highlights the deeply duplicitous logic of its propaganda machine. While requests for comment from the Russian Foreign Ministry about Nazzaro’s residence and The Base’s activities have gone unanswered, their silence only reinforces the pattern of tacit complicity and strategic ambiguity that defines Moscow’s engagement with extremist proxies.
The extent of The Base’s physical presence in Ukraine remains difficult to quantify. In 2019, Ukrainian intelligence deported one of its members who had tried to enlist in the military while espousing neo-Nazi views. Such episodes suggest that Ukrainian counterintelligence remains alert to the group’s presence, even if its influence has been largely marginal thus far. Nonetheless, the context of prolonged conflict, political strain, and hybrid warfare makes the country a vulnerable frontier for radical foreign actors seeking to embed themselves in the chaos.
Despite the growing body of evidence linking Nazzaro to Russian-aligned paramilitary efforts, no public criminal charges have yet been brought against him in the United States. He remains under FBI investigation and was previously labeled a Department of Justice “matter,” indicating federal concern. His public denial of ties to Russian intelligence, including a 2020 appearance on state-controlled RT, where he claimed to have had “no contact with any Russian security services,” now appears increasingly implausible in light of his group’s operations and his strategic use of Russian digital infrastructure. The group’s official recruitment email is a Mail.ru address, a platform closely tied to figures in Vladimir Putin’s digital and political inner circle.
Steven Rai, a senior analyst with the Institute for Strategic Dialogue who monitors international extremism, warns that The Base’s activity should not be dismissed as rhetorical. Since 2023, the group has reappeared in at least ten countries. Arrests have taken place in Belgium, the Netherlands, and Italy, where law enforcement broke up a Base cell allegedly collaborating with Russian far-right terrorists and coordinating recruitment through Telegram. In the United Kingdom, a 15-year-old adherent of the group was arrested for plotting synagogue attacks. Rai emphasizes that while accelerationist groups often exaggerate their reach, The Base has repeatedly demonstrated its ability to attract new recruits who rapidly radicalize and pursue plans for catastrophic violence.
Further solidifying its relationship with the Russian digital sphere, The Base has migrated its propaganda and recruitment activities to VKontakte and Rutube, circumventing Western de-platforming efforts and enjoying relative impunity within Russia’s permissive online environment. This digital ecosystem forms part of the broader architecture through which the Kremlin facilitates, tolerates, or directly enables extremist mobilization. The group’s recent calls for violence in Ukraine first surfaced on its VK profile—indicating, if not operational control by Russian state organs, then at least a tolerance and potentially support for its agenda.
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