From Reparation to Realignment: The Final Chapter of Scholz’s German-Polish Diplomacy


In a symbolic yet substantively charged diplomatic gesture marking the end of his tenure as German Chancellor, Olaf Scholz is scheduled to visit Warsaw for a final meeting with Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk. This farewell encounter, set against the backdrop of escalating geopolitical tensions in Europe and shifting political landscapes in both Germany and Poland, encapsulates the strained yet indispensable relationship between the two nations during Scholz’s chancellorship, and gestures toward what may become a recalibration under the leadership of Scholz’s successor, the Christian Democratic Union’s Friedrich Merz. As reported by DW’s news desk, this meeting arrives at a moment saturated with both political finality and anticipation: Scholz, a Social Democrat who assumed the chancellorship in 2021, has served as caretaker since the implosion of his coalition government in late 2024, and is soon to be replaced following a snap election held in February 2025.

The topics expected to dominate the conversation between Scholz and Tusk are not merely ceremonial; they cut to the heart of the challenges and divergent interests that have defined German-Polish relations under Scholz’s government. These include the war in Ukraine, the future architecture of European security, and lingering wounds from the Second World War that continue to manifest in contemporary debates over reparations. The personal dynamics between Scholz and Tusk — both of whom are seasoned statesmen but who stand on opposite ends of a shifting European ideological spectrum — are themselves indicative of the broader transformations underway within the EU’s core. Tusk, leader of Poland’s center-right Civic Platform, returned to power after defeating the nationalist Law and Justice (PiS) party in 2023, and is preparing for upcoming presidential elections scheduled for May 18, in which incumbent Andrzej Duda is ineligible to run due to term limits.

The political rapport between Berlin and Warsaw was notably fraught during Scholz’s tenure. The most intractable dispute centered on the question of World War II reparations. In 2022, under the PiS government, Poland issued a formal demand for €1.3 trillion in compensation from Germany for wartime damages. Scholz’s administration swiftly rejected the claim, with Foreign Minister Annalena Baerbock stating the matter had been legally settled and closed. Yet tensions persisted, particularly as the German government subsequently proposed a €200 million fund for living Polish victims of the Nazi occupation—an amount widely criticized in Polish media and reportedly deemed insufficient by Tusk’s administration, despite his more conciliatory stance compared to his nationalist predecessors.

Migration policy emerged as another flashpoint. In 2023, a scandal erupted when the Polish government was accused of distributing work visas to migrants from Asia and Africa in exchange for bribes. This practice—deeply controversial within the EU’s border and migration framework—prompted Germany to summon Poland’s ambassador, underlining the degree to which internal Polish affairs could directly affect bilateral trust and cooperation. Compounding this were Germany’s own moves to impose stricter border checks, which drew criticism from Warsaw, and were perceived by some as an implicit rebuke of Poland’s border enforcement mechanisms.

Perhaps no issue more clearly defined the divergence between Scholz and Polish leaders than their differing approaches to Russia’s war on Ukraine. While Tusk’s administration, including Foreign Minister Radoslaw Sikorski, has been vocal in supporting the delivery of long-range Taurus missiles to Ukraine, Scholz remained firm in his refusal. He argued that such a step would risk direct escalation with Moscow—a position that increasingly isolated him within NATO’s eastern flank. This hesitation was interpreted by many in Warsaw as symptomatic of Scholz’s broader cautiousness and reluctance to match Polish urgency in confronting Russian aggression.

With the expected ascension of Friedrich Merz as Germany’s next chancellor—his appointment scheduled for May 6—Polish observers anticipate a shift. Merz, a conservative with Atlanticist leanings and a reputation for more assertive foreign policy rhetoric, has already hinted at a willingness to reconsider the delivery of Taurus missiles to Ukraine, albeit in coordination with European allies. This alignment brings his stance closer to that of Tusk, suggesting a potential revitalization of bilateral relations under the rubric of shared security priorities and ideological affinity. Piotr Buras, head of the Warsaw office of the European Council on Foreign Relations, captured the prevailing mood in Poland by noting that “after Scholz, they believe things can only get better.” In this context, Merz’s decision to prioritize visits to Poland and France upon taking office signals a recognition of Warsaw’s growing strategic weight within the EU and NATO, especially as Eastern Europe assumes a more central role in shaping the continent’s defense posture.

While the precise contours of the post-Scholz era remain to be defined, the farewell meeting between Scholz and Tusk stands as a moment of diplomatic closure and historical inflection. It encapsulates the deep, unresolved tensions between memory and policy, sovereignty and solidarity, and national interest and European unity that have characterized German-Polish relations in recent years. As both countries transition toward new political leaderships, their bilateral relationship will remain a cornerstone of the EU’s cohesion in an increasingly polarized geopolitical landscape.

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