
In a move emblematic of the Trump administration’s sweeping campaign to dismantle mechanisms perceived as encroachments on First Amendment rights, the U.S. Department of State has officially closed its final remaining office dedicated to countering foreign disinformation efforts. The closure of the Counter Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference (R/FIMI) hub—a successor to the Global Engagement Center (GEC), which itself was defunded in December 2024—marks the definitive end of a decade-long government-led project aimed at understanding, tracking, and combating state-sponsored influence campaigns targeting democratic institutions and foreign publics.
This action follows an executive order issued by President Trump focused on “countering censorship and restoring freedom of speech.” The order frames government initiatives addressing misinformation and foreign propaganda as violations of constitutionally protected speech. At the heart of this decision lies the Trump administration’s alignment with a vocal cadre of rightwing critics who argued—despite lacking substantiating evidence—that offices like R/FIMI were, under the pretense of countering foreign disinformation, actually engaged in suppressing conservative American voices. This belief, widely echoed across rightwing media and political circles, formed the ideological backbone of the policy shift now reaching its apex with the closure of R/FIMI.
Secretary of State Marco Rubio, a prominent figure in this effort, emphasized the administration’s intention to rollback what it characterizes as punitive constraints on American speech. In a statement posted to X, Rubio declared, “Over the last decade, Americans have been slandered, fired, charged, and even jailed for simply voicing their opinions. That ends today.” The rhetoric shows the administration’s reframing of disinformation monitoring—not as a national security imperative but as a form of governmental overreach that allegedly infringes on civil liberties. This position represents a reversal from Rubio’s earlier stance; during his confirmation hearing, he had asserted the importance of combating Chinese disinformation as a strategic priority.
R/FIMI, and its predecessor GEC, had focused exclusively on identifying and analyzing disinformation campaigns orchestrated by foreign governments, with no jurisdiction or authority over domestic content. Nonetheless, the perception—amplified by conservative political actors—that such agencies were tools for ideological policing has now led to their systematic dismantling. Rubio condemned the program’s financial cost, claiming it consumed “more than $50 million per year” while “actively silencing and censoring the voices of Americans they were supposed to be serving.” No evidence has been presented publicly to substantiate these allegations.
The closure of R/FIMI creates a notable vacuum in the United States’ strategic toolkit to counter foreign propaganda and digital influence operations at a time when adversarial states continue to scale and refine their information warfare capabilities. Russia, for example, is believed to allocate roughly $1.5 billion annually to foreign influence campaigns. Iran’s principal state media and propaganda wing operated on a $1.26 billion budget in 2022. China’s investments into international media influence and digital interference are even greater, with estimates suggesting “billions of dollars annually,” according to former GEC assessments.
The decision was formally conveyed to R/FIMI’s approximately 40 staff members by acting Undersecretary Darren Beattie, who informed them that all positions would be eliminated. Employees were placed on administrative leave, with dismissal proceedings scheduled to conclude within 30 days. According to sources from the State Department interviewed by MIT Technology Review, no immediate plans exist to reassign or repurpose any of the personnel or infrastructure previously dedicated to the work of counter-disinformation.
Beattie’s appointment to a leadership position overseeing the closure has attracted additional scrutiny. He was previously dismissed as a White House speechwriter during Trump’s first term after revelations that he attended a white nationalist conference. Since then, Beattie has publicly promoted conspiracy theories alleging FBI orchestration of the January 6, 2021 attack on the U.S. Capitol. His reemergence within the Trump administration highlights the ideological cohesion among personnel executing the administration’s agenda on issues related to speech, censorship, and the state’s role in information policy.
The now-defunct R/FIMI, while underfunded and politically embattled, had nevertheless played a crucial role in several high-profile intelligence and counterpropaganda operations. These included the deployment of artificial intelligence systems to detect deepfake content, the publication of analytical reports on Russian and Chinese disinformation networks, and exposure of influence operations in Latin America aimed at distorting public opinion regarding the war in Ukraine. One of its most consequential achievements was the uncovering of a Kremlin-backed initiative in Africa designed to undermine U.S. diplomatic presence by disseminating conspiracy theories about American-sponsored health interventions.
Additionally, in September 2024, the U.S. Department of Justice indicted two employees of RT—Russia’s state-controlled media outlet—following the discovery of a covert operation involving military procurement for Russian forces in Ukraine. The scheme, which operated via online crowdfunding platforms, exemplified the increasingly hybrid nature of modern foreign interference: blending financial infrastructure with information manipulation in ways that challenge conventional intelligence responses.
The elimination of the R/FIMI office is thus more than a bureaucratic contraction. It represents a key ideological repositioning of the United States government on the question of information sovereignty. At a time when rival authoritarian regimes continue to weaponize digital platforms, data analytics, and media systems to distort truth, fracture alliances, and erode democratic cohesion globally, the Trump administration’s decision to vacate this field altogether signals a retreat from the domain of epistemic security. It reflects a shift wherein the protection of national discourse is no longer viewed through the lens of strategic competition or civic resilience, but instead through the prism of internal ideological struggle, reshaping the landscape of U.S. foreign and information policy for the foreseeable future.
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