South Korea Faces Pre-Election Turmoil Amid Court Blow and Leadership Resignations


In an extraordinary escalation of South Korea’s ongoing political crisis, a Supreme Court decision on May 1, 2025, cast a long shadow over the candidacy of Lee Jae-myung, the frontrunner in the nation’s presidential race, while a cascade of high-profile resignations shook the interim government and left the country’s leadership in yet another state of flux. The decision and the subsequent resignations have destabilized an already volatile political scene, emerging in the aftermath of the dramatic downfall of former President Yoon Suk Yeol, who now faces trial for insurrection and additional charges of abuse of power. The developments signal a political system gripped by institutional paralysis, factional rivalries, and a deepening legitimacy crisis, all in the weeks leading up to a snap election scheduled for June 3.

The Supreme Court overturned a prior acquittal of Lee Jae-myung—former head of the liberal Democratic Party—on charges of violating South Korea’s Public Official Election Act by making “false statements” during his 2022 presidential campaign. Chief Justice Jo Hee-de stated in the ruling that Lee’s remarks during the campaign had concerned matters of sufficient gravity to obstruct voters’ accurate judgment of his eligibility for public office. The court did not issue a sentence itself but remanded the case to the appellate court with instructions to determine one. If that court delivers a conviction consistent with the Supreme Court’s findings, Lee would be automatically barred from running for any public office for five years, effectively disqualifying him from the current presidential race. The case, unusually fast-tracked by Supreme Court standards—it ruled within a month of the prosecution’s appeal—still has no fixed deadline at the lower level, and it remains uncertain whether a ruling will materialize before the June vote. Despite the setback, Lee—who has denied all wrongdoing—vowed to honor the will of the people and to continue his political path.

Political scientists and analysts immediately assessed the ruling as a major blow to Lee’s campaign and the liberal opposition. Shin Yul of Myongji University noted that although the legal disqualification remains pending, the Supreme Court’s implicit affirmation of guilt could alienate the moderate swing voters who make up an estimated 10% of the electorate. A Gallup Korea survey conducted just days before the ruling, on April 25, showed Lee as the clear frontrunner with 38% support. By contrast, his conservative rivals trailed far behind—Han Dong-hoon, former head of the People Power Party (PPP), polling at 8%, and acting President Han Duck-soo at just 6%. While Lee remains engulfed in several other criminal proceedings, including corruption and abuse of power allegations, the election law violation stands out as the most politically consequential due to its direct impact on his eligibility.

Compounding the turmoil at the heart of the executive branch, Prime Minister Han Duck-soo—who had been serving as acting president—announced his resignation the same day, confirming widespread speculation that he intends to enter the presidential race himself. In a televised address, Han stated he was stepping down to assume what he described as “a heavier responsibility” in helping the nation through its present crises. Han, 75, has had a tumultuous tenure. Initially installed as acting president after the December 14 impeachment of President Yoon Suk Yeol, he was himself suspended from office just two weeks later after clashing with the opposition-led National Assembly, primarily over his refusal to appoint three justices to the Constitutional Court. Although reinstated on March 24 after the court nullified his impeachment, Han’s position remained politically tenuous. His decision to resign now is widely interpreted as a strategic maneuver to position himself as the conservative bloc’s savior amid the PPP’s collapse in the wake of Yoon’s failed martial law attempt.

Han’s resignation triggered a constitutional succession mechanism whereby Finance Minister Choi Sang-mok was expected to assume the role of acting president. Choi had already briefly served in the role during Han’s prior suspension and Yoon’s legal entanglement. However, Choi, too, abruptly resigned after Parliament reopened impeachment proceedings against him, citing policy decisions he made during his brief presidency—decisions that included controversial economic responses to American tariff escalations. In a written statement, Choi expressed regret for his inability to continue serving during a time of economic distress, both domestically and internationally, and tendered his resignation with immediate effect.

The role of acting president thus fell to Education Minister Lee Ju-ho, who was sworn in at midnight. By law, Lee was next in the line of succession, making him South Korea’s third acting president since Yoon’s removal from office less than five months earlier. In his initial acts, Lee called upon the military to remain on heightened alert and pledged to provide stability in the run-up to the June election. He also urged public institutions to ensure a fair and orderly electoral process. As a figure without a major political base of his own, Lee’s primary role appears to be that of a technocratic caretaker amid a deepening institutional vacuum.

Meanwhile, former President Yoon Suk Yeol’s legal jeopardy worsened considerably. Already indicted for insurrection—an unprecedented charge for a sitting South Korean head of state—Yoon was additionally indicted on May 1 for abuse of authority, according to a statement from prosecutors released via Yonhap. This second indictment follows a raid of Yoon’s private residence in Seoul the day prior, part of a wider investigation that also includes alleged bribery involving his wife, Kim Keon Hee, and a shaman accused of accepting gifts on her behalf. The prosecutors confirmed that Yoon is not currently detained under the new charges, though he remains the central figure in what has become one of the most explosive political scandals in South Korea’s democratic history. If convicted of the insurrection charge alone, Yoon could face a life sentence, or even the death penalty—though the latter is unlikely given that South Korea has not carried out an execution since 1997.

Yoon’s downfall has not only decimated the PPP, leaving it without a clear leader or strategy, but also ignited a broader constitutional crisis. The Constitutional Court’s unanimous decision to strip Yoon of power and uphold the parliamentary motion to impeach him was unprecedented in its clarity and finality, yet it failed to bring immediate institutional stability. Instead, the nation has cycled through interim leaders and faced deepening partisan divides, judicial uncertainty, and public disenchantment. The electoral system is now under enormous pressure to restore legitimacy in the face of what political observers are calling the most serious legitimacy crisis since South Korea’s democratic transition in the late 1980s.

Despite these shocks, the Democratic Party has refused to consider replacing Lee Jae-myung as its candidate, stating unequivocally that he will remain on the ballot unless formally disqualified by a final court decision. This intransigence signals the extent to which Lee’s candidacy has become symbolically and politically inseparable from the opposition’s broader campaign to reestablish civilian rule after Yoon’s militarized overreach. Whether that gamble succeeds or backfires will depend on the actions of the appellate court in the coming weeks, and on an electorate now forced to choose its future amid unprecedented legal ambiguity, executive disarray, and ideological fragmentation.

This unfolding crisis represents a pivotal moment in South Korean history, testing the resilience of its constitutional framework and the maturity of its democratic institutions under the most extreme conditions they have faced in the post-authoritarian era.

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