Yesterday Japan’s new prime minister, Sanae Takaichi, entered office with an agenda centered on accelerated security reform and a first major diplomatic test: back-to-back encounters with U.S. President Donald Trump beginning around the ASEAN summit in Malaysia on Sunday and continuing with formal talks in Tokyo early next week. The timing compresses her room for preparation while amplifying the stakes: Washington is expected to probe Tokyo’s willingness to spend more on defense and to signal how the new government will position itself between deterrence needs and regional diplomacy.
At home, Takaichi governs from a position of relative parliamentary fragility. Sworn in on Tuesday, she leads a bloc that is two seats short of a majority in the 465-member lower house, obliging her Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) to assemble issue-by-issue support from opposition benches. Analysts describe this as her principal vulnerability in talks with Trump: an ambitious defense program paired with uncertain legislative arithmetic. According to Michael Green, who heads the United States Studies Centre in Australia and formerly served on the U.S. National Security Council, Takaichi is conservative, intent on higher military outlays, and has branded herself a “Japan First” leader; yet the gap between aspiration and vote counts may constrain the promises she can credibly make.
Politically, the coalition realignment marks a decisive break with the recent past. The LDP ended its 26-year partnership with the pacifist-leaning Komeito and brought in the right-leaning Japan Innovation Party (Ishin). That shift removes Komeito’s traditional brake on security legislation and aligns the coalition around objectives that echo the late Shinzo Abe’s approach: constitutional revision to clarify the role of the Self-Defense Forces, expanded capabilities to deter China, and a loosening of arms-export restrictions. Ishin figures have even aired the idea of U.S.-style nuclear sharing—granting Tokyo a voice over any U.S. nuclear weapons deployed in Japan—though such a move would cut against Japan’s longstanding “three non-nuclear principles” of not possessing, producing, or hosting nuclear arms.
In her first policy address to parliament on Friday, Takaichi said Japan will bring forward—by two years—the target of doubling defense spending to 2% of GDP, aiming to reach that level by the end of the current fiscal year on March 31. She cast the acceleration as a necessary response to a deteriorating security environment and framed it in terms of initiative rather than dependency: Japan, she said, must take the lead in fundamentally strengthening its defenses. She has also reiterated that a contingency in the Taiwan Strait would constitute a direct crisis for both Japan and the United States, a formulation that underscores how closely Tokyo links its security to the regional balance.
Beijing’s early reaction combined substantive concern with historical signaling. Chinese foreign ministry spokesperson Guo Jiakun urged Japan to “reflect on its history of aggression,” adhere to a path of peace, and exercise caution in military and security policy—remarks that implicitly referenced Takaichi’s reputation as a frequent visitor to the Yasukuni Shrine, which many in China regard as emblematic of unrepented militarism. The dissolution of the LDP-Komeito alliance also subtracts a coalition partner known for cultivated ties to Beijing, a loss that, as Kenji Minemura of the Canon Institute for Global Studies notes, may complicate management of the bilateral relationship even as Tokyo hardens its deterrence posture.
The coming meetings with Trump are expected to test how Takaichi converts alignment of aims into executable commitments. Ryo Sahashi, a political scientist at the University of Tokyo, argues that the real constraint is the budget process: however firm the intention to accelerate, a minority government will struggle to legislate large step-ups—let alone any move toward 3% of GDP—without securing opposition votes. Jeffrey Hornung of RAND adds that pressure from Washington for specific numerical targets could create friction early, if Tokyo is seen to hedge on timelines or ceilings.
Against that backdrop, Tokyo appears to be assembling a package designed to show value to the United States even where parliamentary headwinds slow defense appropriations. According to sources, the government is preparing proposals that bundle additional imports from the U.S.—such as Ford F-150 pickup trucks, soybeans, and liquefied natural gas—with a menu of potential U.S. investments in Japan. The approach mirrors a broader tactic in U.S.–Japan relations: coupling security coordination with trade and industrial measures that can be presented as mutually beneficial and politically saleable in both capitals.
Public sentiment has so far afforded Takaichi a reserve of goodwill. A Kyodo News poll reported 64% approval among 1,053 respondents for the new government, an early endorsement that may give her momentum as she confronts near-term tests. Still, legislative realities remain inescapable. Unlike Abe at his peak, Takaichi must “shop” for votes to pass core bills, and the composition of those ad hoc coalitions will determine how far and how fast Japan can move on sensitive files, from constitutional revision to arms-export reform.
Symbolism will also thread through the diplomacy. Media have reported that Akie Abe, widow of the former prime minister assassinated in 2022 and a personal link to Trump, will meet the U.S. president during his visit. There is even talk of revisiting a golf course associated with Abe’s 2019 hospitality—a reminder that personal rapport runs alongside policy in this relationship. For Takaichi, an admirer of Margaret Thatcher and a protégé of Abe’s conservative project, the task now is to translate ideological clarity into workable policy under minority conditions, reassure neighbors that a stronger Japan remains anchored in self-defense, and navigate an opening exchange with Washington that sets expectations without overpromising.
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